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STRANGERS ON A TRAIN
Pierre N. Leval*
MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Anthony Lewis. New York: Random House. 1991. Pp.
xii, 354. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $13.00.
A book reviewed two years after its publication had best be important, and lastingly so. Anthony Lewis's 1 Make No Law 2 easily qualifies. The book's importance derives in part from the immense (and
easily undervalued) importance of its subject - the Supreme Court's
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 3
This fascinating study reveals how Justice Brennan, the author of
the Supreme Court's opinion, in his perspicacity, boldness, and statesmanship, rescued the nation from not one but two insidious dangers.
In so doing, Brennan earned his place in a tiny group - Madison,
Jefferson, Hand, Holmes, Brandeis, Black-who, understanding how
essential to a free society is a free marketplace for discussion, rescued
freedom of speech from xenophobic hysteria.
Mr. Lewis is an ideal narrator of this morality play, for he is a
journalist, historian, and legal scholar, as well as a lucid and exciting
writer. This book harnesses all these powers. For Lewis, a story is not
a single narrative line with a beginning and an end, but a confluence of
innumerable rivers of history that stretch endlessly into the past and
the future. The story of Justice Brennan's great, liberating opinion is
inseparable from the history of slavery and the South's refusal to lose
the Civil War for one hundred years after Appomattox- inseparable
from the embattled concept of free speech going back through swerving changes to Madison and Jefferson, to Mill, Blackstone, Milton,
and Henry VIII.
What we might call "Book One" is the story of slavery, the "peculiar institution" of the old South, the cornerstone of its economic system, euphemistically sanctioned in the original text of the
Constitution; it is the story of the Civil War, which brought the issue
of slavery to the fore, and of the next hundred years of defiant southern adherence to institutions designed to perpetuate the subjugation of
the black race, a struggle to which the defeated proslavery forces of
the South were far more deeply committed than their northern opposi" Judge, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. -Ed.
1. Anthony Lewis is a columnist for The New York Times.
2. [hereinafter cited by page number only].
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tion. The Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 forbade slavery; the South
responded with Black Codes that accomplished a subjugation almost
as invidious as slavery. To the first Civil Rights Acts4 (providing for
the right to contract and hold property) and the Fourteenth Amendment, the South responded with Jim Crow laws segregating all public
facilities, which received constitutional approval from the Supreme
Court in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson. 5 For another half century little
changed. Any attempts at civil rights legislation were stymied by
southern senators's artful manipulation, often by filibuster, of the rules
of congressional procedure. Finally, in 1954 the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board ofEducation, 6 and an effective, broad-based civil
rights movement came alive. There followed Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. and his movement of nonviolent resistance, Rosa Parks and the
success of the Montgomery bus boycott, and in 1957 the first Civil
Rights Act since 1875. The response was White Citizens Councils and
violent assaults on Freedom Riders of the civil rights movement, as
well as on blacks exercising their newly accorded rights. Northern
journalists, including Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times, reported on this violence. Civil rights groups placed ads in the northern
press calling attention to the violence and soliciting support for their
cause. This history sets Lewis's stage for New York Times v. Sullivan.
"Book Two" is a chilling, detailed account of the South's adoption,
particularly in Alabama, of an ingenious, devastating counteroffensive
weapon against the civil rights movement. The weapon was the libel
action, brought before biased judges and juries (all white), designed to
silence and punish the press. Numerous officials of local government
sued for libel in the courts of Alabama, seeking many millions in aggregate damages against the New York Times. The first suits were
aimed at Salisbury's news accounts and at an ad placed by a Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in
the South. The ad sought contributions, calling attention to the violent repression of the peaceful demonstrations protesting segregation.
One of the suits was brought by L. B. Sullivan, a city commissioner of
Montgomery, who was not mentioned, even obliquely, in the ad, but
who claimed that the ad's mention of the Montgomery police, for
which he was responsible, libelled him. The ad was found to contain a
few innocuous mistakes of fact. For example, Dr. King had been arrested four times, not seven; armed police did not "ring" the campus
where black students were seeking admission as the ad alleged, but
were deployed nearby; protesting black students had sung the "National Anthem,'' not "My Country 'Tis of Thee"; and students had
4. Civil Rights Acts of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; 1871, ch. 99, 16
Stat. 433 and ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337.
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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been expelled not for demonstrating at the Capitol, but for demanding
service at a lunch counter in the County Courthouse.
Lewis recounts a frightening tale of abuse of judicial power in the
Alabama trial court (pp. 23-25): every ruling was made against the
defendants, regardless of precedent, regardless even of the judge's own
contrary assertions in his treatise on Alabama procedure; the judge
ruled the statements libelous per se; the issue of falsity was taken from
the jury because the Times had admitted the inaccuracy of certain relatively innocuous details; damage to Sullivan's reputation was presumed. The jury then dutifully awarded the full $500,000 demand,
and the Supreme Court of Alabama unceremoniously affirmed. By the
time Sullivan's action reached the Supreme Court, another Montgomery official's suit had also produced a $500,000 judgment. Eleven
more actions were pending (pp. 35, 151). If such judgments could
stand, it would not take long for the Alabama courts to put the New
York Times either out of business altogether, or out of the business of
reporting on the violent southern resistance to the lawful integration
of the schools and public facilities.
Lewis's third history turns to explore the development of the concept of a free press (pp. 46-102). This notion, as we understand it
today, managed only recently, and just barely, to establish itself on a
small part of the earth's surface, thanks largely to a few visionaries.
The invention of the printing press was very soon followed by the
institution of royal licensing in England. Although introduced in the
guise of a revenue raising excise, the impetus for licensing derived
more probably from the desire to exercise royal control over a potentially destabilizing instrument. The printing press was a menace because it facilitated the dissemination of dangerous ideas.
In England, even the most vociferous opponents of censorship had
no quarrel with the infliction of severe subsequent punishment for inappropriate publications. Milton, for example, whose Areopagitica
had thundered against licensing of the printed word, believed that for
works "found [to be] mischievous and libelous, the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectuall remedy ...." 7
And long after Britain did away with censorship, it continued to
punish the crime of seditious libel - the publication of statements
about government officials that would tend to expose them to public
disrespect. Stability of government was deemed the most highly
prized value. Seditious libels might threaten that stability and thus
required severe punishment. Truth was no defense. Indeed, when the
libel was true, it was all the more dangerous.
The notion of a free press that developed in England was of a press
that was largely free from previous restraint, but not free from punish7. P. 52 (citing 4 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, in THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 293, 353 (Columbia Univ. Press 1931) (1644)).
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ment for inappropriate publications. According to Blackstone, "to
punish ... any dangerous or offensive writings ... [because of their]
pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and
good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of
civil liberty." 8
It is startling how close these notions came to taking root on
American soil. War and turmoil are never a healthy climate for freedom of speech. In 1798 John Adams was President of the new democracy. His Federalist party controlled both houses of Congress.
Roiling with suspicion and fear of France's new populist government,
which was lopping off heads with abandon and had attacked American merchant ships carrying cargo to England, the Federalists identified the opposition party of Vice President Jefferson and of Madison as
dangerous French sympathizers "sowing the seeds of vice, irreligion,
corruption and sedition" (p. 57).
Fresh from the establishment of the Bill of Rights, with its guarantee that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of
the press," 9 the Federalist Congress passed its own Sedition Act of
1798, making it a crime punishable by up to two years imprisonment
and a fine of up to $2000 (real money in those days) to "publish ...
any false, scandalous and malicious writing . . . against the government ... , either house of the Congress ... or the President ... with
intent to defame ... or to bring them ... into contempt or disrepute
... or to excite against them ... the hatred of the good people of the
United States." 10 It was against the party of Madison and Jefferson
that the Sedition Act was aimed - as made unmistakably clear by the
fact that, while protecting the President and the Congress, it carefully
omitted the Vice President (Jefferson) from the scope of its protection.
There was no penalty for exciting the hatred of the good people of the
United States against him. Happily, the Sedition Act had a wonderful
feature that today's Congress should be encouraged to employ: it carried a sunset provision; designed to protect the Federalist government
during President Adams's term, the Act expired on the day his term
ended. 11 Its Federalist proponents believed the Act passed constitutional muster by reason of the Blackstonian British view that freedom
of the press meant no more than freedom from prior restraint, and
that the power to punish seditious writings was necessary to preserve
peace, order, and a stable government. (One of the Act's most eloquent supporters was the Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall.)
The case against the Sedition Act was championed by Jefferson
and Madison, acting largely in secret to avoid prosecution. Madison
8. P. 54 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. P. 58 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)).
11. Pp. 58, 65 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)).
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drafted the Virginia Resolutions, which proclaimed "the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication
among the people thereon" as "the only effectual guardian of every
other right." 12 Madison reasoned that the British precedents had no
application here because of the different foundations of government.
In Britain, the legitimacy of government derived from the sovereign.
In the United States, it was the people who bestowed legitimacy on the
government. Because the people were the source of all power, their
right to free discussion of public matters was paramount.
By authority of the Sedition Act, numerous opponents of the Federalist government were prosecuted, jailed, and fined. The defendants
included editors and publishers of newspapers, pamphleteers, and a
Congressman who wrote a letter to the editor. By reason of the Act's
expiration, and Jefferson's succession to the Presidency, it was never
reviewed in the Supreme Court. Jefferson promptly pardoned those
convicted, stating "that law to be a nullity, as absolute and palpable as
if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image"
(p. 65).
The Blackstonian view was not dead, however. It recovered
strength in this century. Ironically, it was Holmes, later to be a great
champion of press freedom, who found no problem in Patterson v. Colorado 13 affirming the contempt conviction of an editor who had criticized a judge. The First Amendment guaranteed freedom from prior
restraints but did not bar punishment of publications contrary to the
public welfare.
·
Madison had proclaimed it a "universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or
pretended, from abroad." 14 The accuracy of his observation was reaffirmed at the outbreak of World War I when Congress passed a socalled Espionage Act, which made it a crime to "attempt to cause ...
disloyalty ... or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States" or to "attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
service." 15
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court, through Holmes, affirmed a
conviction under the Espionage Act. 16 Although pulling back from
his view in Patterson that freedom meant nothing more than immunity
from prior restraint, Holmes affirmed that in wartime circumstances
Congress might punish speech that incited "a clear and present danger
12. P. 61 (citing JAMES MADISON, THE VA. RESOLUTIONS (1798), reprinted in THE WRIT·
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 328-29 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam 1906)).
13. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
14. P. 56 (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), in THE
COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS, at 257-58 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953)).
15. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, as amended by Act of May 16,
1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, 553.
16. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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[of] substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 17 Holmes
had even less difficulty affirming the conviction of Eugene Debs for a
socialist speech suggesting that men who had been convicted of abetting draft obstruction were "paying the penalty for standing erect and
for seeking to pave the way to better conditions for all mankind." 18
Into this turmoil enters a great and unrecognized hero of press
freedom's struggle to be born - a district judge, Learned Hand, who
enjoined the postmaster from barring circulation of an antiwar magazine.19 Hand based his decision on the "right to criticise either by
temperate reasoning, or by immoderate and indecent invective, which
is normally the privilege of the individual in countries dependent upon
the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority." 20
Hand thus interpreted the prohibition of the Espionage Act to reach
only "direct incitement to violent resistance" (p. 70). Hand's identification of "free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority" in our form of government was visionary - and slow to gain
acceptance. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. 21
Hand's opinion itself was largely forgotten for decades. Nonetheless, Hand's influence soon grew significant because of a happenstance,
an almost magical event of fable simplicity, and of inestimable importance for our republic - the chance meeting of Holmes and Hand on
a train, one of those amazing events, too beautiful and unreal for the
movies, that now and then take place in the real world. In those days
travel was slow and afforded opportunities for leisurely conversation.
Hand, the young district judge, discreetly sketched his notions of free
speech's necessary role in a democratic state. After the train ride, the
two jurists corresponded. In these exchanges (unearthed by Gerald
Gunther, Hand's biographer),22 Hand gently moved an initially unreceptive Holmes ("I'm afraid I don't quite get your point.")23 toward
the view that opinions on public matters need to be well tested and
scrutinized, that this cannot happen unless they may be uttered freely,
and that speech should be punishable only when "directly an incitement" to illegality, and not based on a mere "tendency" to a bad
result.
Hand's influence percolated into Holmes's consciousness. The
next test before the Supreme Court in Abrams v. United States 24 re17. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
18. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213 (1919).
19. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y 1917), revd., 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
20. 244 F. at 539.
21. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917).
22. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 732-44 (1975).
23. P. 75 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand, Apr. 3, 1919, reprinted in Gunther, supra note 22, at 759-60).
24. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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sulted from convictions under even more repressive amendments to
the Espionage Act, which made it a crime to print "disloyal ... scurrilous or abusive language" about the Constitution, the military, or the
flag. 25 The Supreme Court easily affirmed the convictions for distributing procommunist leaflets urging workers to "[w]ake up" and save
"Russia's emancipation" from "his Majesty, Mr. Wilson, and the rest
of his gang; dogs of all colors."26 This time, however, Holmes dissented, joined by Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Although Holmes professed to stand by his earlier opinions, the new dissent spoke in a
dramatically different voice. Where the "clear and present danger"
formula had earlier justified punishment, it was now summoned fortified with additional, more protective adjectives and adverbs - to
create a wide zone of immunity for objectionable opinions. Holmes's
dissenting opinion, permeated by thoughts Hand had planted, is a
magnificent declaration of the principles that are now acknowledged
to underlie the First Amendment.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . . That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all
life is an experiment . . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country. 27

Through the next decade, in Gitlow, Whitney and Schwimmer, 28 the
great dissenters Holmes and Brandeis "persuaded the country and, in
time, the Court. "29
What often matters most in determining the content of the rules is
who makes them. Thus, it was perhaps predictable that the most tenacious of restrictive limitations on press freedom were the judge-made
rules that imposed contempt for public commentary on pending litigation - a rule which remains in full force in Britain and in Canada.
Judges dislike press commentary on cases in progress, especially jury
25. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, as amended by Act of May 16, 1918, ch.
75, 40 Stat. 553.
26. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 620.
27. 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).
28. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 {1925) (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J. & Holmes, J., concurring); United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. P. 89. Their Whitney opinion was technically a concurrence because procedural default
prevented the defendant from relying in the Supreme Court on constitutional issues she had not
raised below. In spirit, however, it dissented powerfully from the state's power to prosecute for
criminal syndicalism. "It is the function of speech," Brandeis wrote, "to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears." 274 U.S. at 376.
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cases, because the commentary can influence the result, or even abort
the proceeding. In the United States, the rule forbidding such commentary was dispatched in 1941 in Bridges v. California 30 thanks to
the visionary perseverance of Justice Hugo Black, and the persuasive
power of his draft dissenting opinion, which became the opinion of the
Court when it persuaded a wavering member of the initial majority to
change sides and eventually captured a new Justice appointed since
the initial hearing. Lewis powerfully exploits the irony of how frail
and accidental are many of the threads from which history is woven
- how close it all came to turning out otherwise. Black, now writing
for the majority and, in the interest of statesmanship and victory, compromising his far more absolute views of freedom of speech, restated
Holmes's chameleon's test, ever more heavily clad with the protective
armor of adverbs and adjectives: "What finally emerges from the
'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished." 31
Now Mr. Lewis's peripatetic adventure returns to Montgomery,
Commissioner Sullivan, and the New York Times, as their case advances to the Supreme Court. How could a libel case reach the
Supreme Court? Libel was governed by state tort law; it lay outside
the protection of the First Amendment (false calumny having no claim
on freedom of speech) and, therefore, outside the scope of the Supreme
Court's power. Yet, what could be more clear, certainly in hindsight,
than that Alabama's devastating libel verdicts would succeed in establishing censorship and destroying freedom of the press? As Madison,
Jefferson, and Hand had instinctively perceived, and Holmes had more
gradually learned, subsequent punishments, if sufficiently grave, are
effective prior restraints.
The New York Times, threatened with extinction, drafted into its
service Herbert Wechsler, one of the nation's most powerful,
respected, and uncompromising scholars of constitutional law, to seek
review by the Supreme Court.
Among the most challenging tasks faced by an appellate litigator,
especially in the Supreme Court, is judging how high to aim. If the
human race were rational, a contention of law would have the same
persuasive force whether it is listed first or third. But life doesn't work
that way. If the first argument offends or alienates any of the Justices,
the logical force of the third approach may be lost. On the other hand,
if the third argument can win only a portion of what is at stake, can
the litigator afford to forego the more ambitious contentions? There
are no easy answers.
Wechsler, and his assistant Marvin Frankel, then a teacher at the
30. 314 U.S. 252.
31. 314 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added).
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Columbia Law School and later a federal judge, developed, juggled,
and presented several arguments that varied greatly in the size of the
prize they offered (pp. 107-09, 113-22). The most ambitious was the
contention, building on the thinking of Jefferson and Madison, that
the ability to criticize government was essential to a free society; that
the Alabama damage award in favor of an officer of government effectively reinstated the concept of seditious libel, anathema to the First
Amendment; and hence, that no such cause of action should be permitted. It was a bold argument, based on simple concepts, capable of
winning the press immunity from suit for criticism of a public official.
It was likely to appeal to Justice Black and maybe others, but likely
also to offend Justices who were more cautious. Such an argument
might be seen to ignore valid concerns of federalism and, furthermore,
to render all those in government service defenseless against press
excesses.
A more complicated position, offering a more circumscribed victory, was based on an obscure precedent from Kansas; 32 it argued that
libel of a public official was not actionable unless intentionally false, or
reckless in the face of likely falsity. The First Amendment protects
good faith criticism of government, even when it falls into error, but
not deliberate or wanton falsehood.
Still more circumspect was the argument that Commissioner Sullivan's judgment could not stand because the criticisms in the Times ad
were not about him: the First Amendment demands, at least, that
libel judgments not be awarded in favor of persons who were not objects of the criticism. Such an argument might win this case, but
would offer no protection for cases where a government official was
actually criticized. This position would therefore do little to protect
the Times from punishments administered by the southern courts for
its news reporting (pp. 120-21).
Finally, there was the argument that the Times's sale of a few copies and employment of a stringer in Alabama did not subject it to suit
in Alabama. Because the libel law was traditionally thought to fall
outside the scope of the First Amendment, some considered this the
only argument with a chance of winning (p. 122).
When a litigator actually appears before a court to argue, he loses
control to some extent of his strategies. Wechsler had been determined to stress the more conservative, less threatening arguments.
But Justice Black, intrigued by the bold contention of absolute freedom of the press to criticize government, persistently questioned him
on this theory, endangering Wechsler's ability to present the more
conservative arguments. Wechsler was relatively confident of Black's
32. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723 (1908).
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vote and thus did not need to woo him. But Black's questioning prevented him from wooing the Justices he needed to worry about.
Once it had agreed to review the Alabama decision, the Supreme
Court faced a case which, like many on its docket, involved a clash
between fundamental government policies. At stake on the one hand
was the ability of the press to discharge its most important duties in a
democracy: to report and comment on the actions of government. On
the other lay the sanctity of the federalist principle that the states and
their judicial systems should adjudicate disputes arising under their
law without interference from Washington. Also involved were principles of stability and democratic responsibility, principles that disfavor the creation of new law by courts whose judges hold life tenure
without responsibility to any electorate.
Other questions of momentous importance lurked slightly below
the surface. Would the adoption of a rule that immunized the press
from responsibility for defamation create a monster? Would an affirmance of a state's power to eviscerate the press through libel judgments
doom the success of the civil rights movement? If the reactionary
forces of segregation could intimidate, beat, or even murder civil rights
volunteers and citizens who claimed their lawful entitlements, without
the ability of the press to report on the events, would the movement
die?
Justice Brennan's opinion strikes a careful and interesting balance.
It protects the essential functions of the press from intimidation by the
threat of money damage awards, so long as the defamatory material
was published in good faith. There is no absolute immunity. No protection is given to false defamatory publications that are shown by
clear and convincing evidence to be intentionally false or published in
reckless disregard of their probable falsity. The opinion recognizes,
however, that a biased jury under the supervision of a biased judge can
and will return a biased verdict regardless of the standard explained in
the instructions. Thus, the opinion gives the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, the duty to examine the evidence of intentional falsity or reckless disregard to make sure that it complies with
the exacting standard of proof mandated by the First Amendment.
The Court was thus able to protect the Times, and the press generally,
from a succession of crushing money judgments that would have been
awarded regardless of the standards prescribed in the jury instructions. This was a great, visionary, and artful decision. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, a leading spokesman for freedom of the press,
described it as "an occasion for dancing in the streets" (p. 154).
The outcome in the Supreme Court was not a foregone conclusion.
One of the most fascinating passages of Lewis's book is its rare exploration of the negotiating process that occurred offstage in the Supreme
Court. These unusual glimpses of private communications between
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Justices became available to the author for two reasons. First, Justice
Brennan's papers have been deposited with the manuscript section of
the Library of Congress. Second, it was Brennan's habit to assign a
clerk to memorialize the negotiating history of every opinion he wrote;
Steven R. Barnett, now a law professor at Berkeley, recorded the fascinating evolution of the Sullivan opinion, which reflects the personalities of the major participants. The process reveals Brennan's clarity of
thought, his perceptive recognition of how very high were the stakes,
his statesmanship, and his patient inclination to persuade by reason
rather than by invective or result-oriented labeling.
From the Justices's first conference there was no doubt that the
Alabama judgment would be vacated. All nine Justices agreed to this
result, but generally on a narrow ground - insufficient reference in
the advertisement to the plaintiff - that would have done nothing to
deal with the larger problems posed by the case.
Chief Justice Warren's assignment of Brennan to write the opinion
of the Court perhaps resulted from Warren's recognition that, like
Baker v. Carr, 33 this was a task calling for imagination, flexibility, and
statesmanship. Brennan's search for an appropriate solution that
would kill the dragons unleashed by the Alabama libel tactic, without
offending the deep commitment to federalism shared by several of the
court's members and without yielding to constitutional extremism,
took him through eight different approaches.
It was of crucial importance to Brennan that he succeed in structuring an opinion that would command a majority of the Court. Brennan worked to carve out a compromise of values that allowed the press
latitude for the honest errors that inevitably accompany free debate,
but denied protection to deliberate falsity. Thus, in the earliest drafts,
he formulated the so-called "malice" element, requiring proof that the
falsity was knowing or reckless. Warren and White came aboard
early, but the difficulty of Brennan's task increased when Black, Douglas, and Goldberg declared that they would subscribe only to an absolute immunity for criticism of public officials. Brennan could not
accept the view that the Constitution shielded deliberate defamatory
lies about public officials. To win a majority Brennan needed to persuade four of the five remaining Justices. He considered it crucial to
win over Harlan because Harlan's legendary stature and moderation
were likely to bring others aboard with him and give comfort in conservative circles (p. 171).
A major obstacle was how to deal with the possibility of a retrial in
the Alabama courts. The easiest formulations of an opinion reversing
the judgment below would allow the case to be retried, with specified
obligatory mutterings to the jury about the need for proof of actual
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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malice, followed by exactly the same result, or worse. This would accomplish little. Brennan seems to have perceived instinctively that retrial was unthinkable, before he fully understood the framing of
constitutional reasons for that result. His early drafts ended with "Reversed," implicitly foreclosing any.hypothetical/urther proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. This result, however, made Harlan's
support unlikely, for Harlan's devotion to federalism would probably
make him unreceptive to the Supreme Court trumping the State's adjudicatory power. Yet the first surprise was a memo from Harlan requesting the inclusion of a discussion expressly foreclosing retrial
because plaintiff Sullivan had failed to proffer evidence capable of satisfying the constitutional standard of actual malice. 34
Black privately warned Brennan that he did not believe Harlan
would adhere to this view. Black believed the theory was incompatible with Harlan's devotion to federalism and states's rights, and Black
was right, at least for a while. Once Harlan had inspected a draft
opinion that included his own suggestion as to why new trial should be
barred, he withdrew his agreement with this position (pp. 175-76).
Brennan tried new formulations, suggesting, for example, that the
high courts were obliged to inspect trial records to be sure that the
evidence of deliberate falsehood was sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's
burden to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Harlan was not
persuaded. Worse still, Clark appeared convinced by Harlan, and
White's adherence to Brennan's formulation began to waiver.
Douglas and Goldberg suddenly proposed a solution. They might
agree to join in Brennan's opinion while noting their preference for the
more extreme press protections they advocated. But the offer was
shortlived. Black, as shepherd of the :flock of free-speech absolutists,
corralled them back into the fold. Brennan did not have five votes; it
looked like there would be no majority opinion and, notwithstanding
reversal of the Sullivan judgment, no solution to the ghastly threat
posed by libel actions (pp. 179-80).
The resolution was startling and bizarre. Suddenly Justice Clark,
who had planned to write separately, advised that he would join in the
opinion without reservation if Brennan would state in the controversial Part III that Supreme Court review of the sufficiency of the evidence was required by principles of "effective judicial administration."
Why Clark found talismanic power in those words will always remain
a mystery, but taken together with Stewart, who also had agreed to
join, it meant five votes - and an opinion whose theory carried the
authority of the Supreme Court (p. 180).
34. Pp. 172-73. Although this requirement was newly imposed since the trial seeking a simple libel judgment, it applied under Alabama law to an award of punitive damages. As Sullivan
had sought punitive damages, it could be assumed he had advanced all the evidence he could in
support of that theory, and he failed to satisfy the test.
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As the opinion went to press, another gift dropped from heaven.
Harlan telephoned Brennan at home on Sunday evening. He had decided to withdraw his separate memorandum and to concur in Brennan's opinion without exception. Harlan's concurrence would
guarantee acceptance in conservative circles. The decision of the
Supreme Court was announced at 10:00 a.m. the next morning (pp.
181-82).

* * *

I became apprehensive as I approached the final "book" of this
epic. The title of a concluding chapter proclaims, "The Dancing Has
Stopped." I groaned. Was this wonderful history about to be marred
in its last chapters by the tiresome, obligatory refrain of the press on
the occasion of every court ruling that is not exactly to its liking? The
First Amendment, it seems, lies battered, tattered, and bloody in the
street; freedom of speech is dead; fascism is reborn.
No such thing! Lewis's concluding chapters are balanced and interesting. Lewis himself deplores the press's habitual Greek chorus:
"When the Supreme Court decides a case against a claimed press interest, editors and publishers too often act as if the Constitution were
gone" (p. 209). The Court's Herbert v. Lando decision, 35 requiring
press disclosure of its editing process - an inescapable, logical consequence of the plaintiff's new obligation to prove press dishonesty was absurdly denounced in editorials as "Orwellian" and "inhibiting
to the press to a degree seldom seen outside a ... Fascist country" (p.
209).
Far from joining the chorus, Lewis notes its absurdity. If the press
often comes out badly in jury verdicts, Lewis observes, it has itself to
blame to some degree. A part of its fault lies in its arrogance. As
analyzed by Rodney Smolla, "The establishment press takes itself so
seriously." It purports "to dispense not merely news but Truth." 36
The problem is aggravated by the press's "stiff-necked" refusal to admit mistakes, as well as by its further claims of entitlement to exalted
status under the Constitution. While the First Amendment gives the
press broad license to pry into the business of others, it is argued to
have the opposite meaning when anyone seeks information from the
press. According to the widespread credo of the press, it is better that
an innocent defendant should be falsely convicted and sent to jail for
want of exculpatory evidence than that a reporter should be compelled
to reveal anything she has learned. Lewis expresses doubt that this
rule is to be found in the First Amendment. Oddly, however, Lewis
concludes that when torn between her promise of confidentiality and
the court's order requiring the reporter to name the source, what the
reporter should do is go to jail without complaining, thankful that this
35. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
36. P. 207 (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 9-19 (1986)).
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happens only rarely. "That is [the] painful price for the journalist to
pay ... " (p. 210). Under this solution, the wrongfully convicted criminal defendant will join the journalist in jail. If, as Lewis suggests, this
is a time when other values trump the press's entitlements, shouldn't
the reporter comply with the subpoena? Lewis's proposal, sending her
to jail (while cajoling her not to complain), seems the second worst
possible solution.
The chapter heading alluding to the end of the dancing turns out
not necessarily to be Lewis's evaluation, but a quotation of someone
else. The bulls and the bears, it seems, agree that dancing may not be
warranted. What these concluding chapters suggest is either that
Meiklejohn was a trifle overoptimistic in proclaiming a festival of terpsichore, or, more likely, that he meant only a few days and nights of
dancing, not an eternity. Notwithstanding Sullivan, the future will not
be rosy for anyone. The issue is difficult and complicated. Were it not
so, Justice Brennan would deserve a less generous share of our
admiration.
False libel can inflict pain, humiliation, and ruin. There are publishers, editors, and reporters, in print and on the airwaves, who care
more for sensation than for truth. A story that does not make someone look bad is not much of a story. Lewis is confident that the defamatory inclination of the press is no more pronounced today than it
was at the birth of the nation. The scurrilous habits of the early nineteenth-century press produced in Jefferson a dramatic change of attitude. Early in his career he said, "Were it left for me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer
the latter. " 37 After he had been President for six years, he wrote,
"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth
itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle." 38
While Sullivan left the press more free to shed light and expose evil, it
also left it more free to defame, even to lie. The deliberateness of a lie
is difficult to prove, especially by the heightened standard of "clear
and convincing evidence."
On the other hand, notwithstanding Sullivan's protection, the
press does take some horrible, unwarranted beatings in the courts,
which do indeed threaten its ability to function. Juries sometimes
award outrageous damages - especially in favor of a hometown favorite against an evil-empire corporation (from New York, if at all
possible). Furthermore, the expense of defending such suits, particularly when huge damages are sought, can be ruinous. Judges have special responsibilities, Lewis argues, to reduce excessive verdicts and to
grant summary judgments in appropriate cases (p. 214). I agree
37. P. 206 (citing SAUL PADOVER, THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 92 (1954)).
38. P. 207 (citing PADOVER, supra note 37, at 97).
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wholeheartedly with both positions. Judges should not permit the jury
trial to become our substitute for the guillotine in gratifying the blood
lust of the populace.
To illustrate his demand for more liberal grants of summary judgment that would spare the press the ruinous expense of trial, Lewis
takes this judge to task for having failed to grant summary judgment
dismissing General Westmoreland's libel suit against CBS. It is not
my intention to rail indignantly against his contention. This was, as
my opinion acknowledges, 39 a close, difficult question. Indeed, one of
the judges I most admire, James L. Oakes, formerly Chief Judge of the
Second Circuit, told me that in his view I should have granted summary judgment.
However, Lewis's discussion makes such a judgment far easier to
reach than in fact it was. This is so for several reasons. Westmoreland's suit arose from a CBS documentary asserting that the General,
as Commander of the United States forces in Vietnam, had falsely reported to the President on the strength of the opposing force. According to Lewis,
The case turned in part on whether certain [Vietcong] local guerilla
forces should be included in the estimated numbers of soldiers that the
United States and South Vietnamese forces were facing. But that question in tum depended on a judgment of what kind of war it was. There
could be no provable "truth" about such matters . . . . Judge Leval ...
would have done better to recall Justice Harlan's warning in the case of
Time Inc. v. Hill: "In many areas which are at the center of public debate, "truth" is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to preexisting prejudices of a jury the determination of what is "true" may
effectively constitute a system of censorship." [p. 217]

First, Lewis has slightly, but significantly, mischaracterized the issue in the lawsuit. Had it really been a question whether General
Westmoreland was right or wrong in his failure to include those militia elements in his estimates of enemy strength, I might have granted
summary judgment. But the issue was different. The documentary
did not accuse General Westmoreland of simply faulty or incompetent
intelligence analysis. It accused him of dishonesty. The charge was
that he deliberately distorted his reported estimates of enemy strength,
intending to deceive the President by painting a dishonestly optimistic
picture of a winnable war to support his demand for additional troops.
Thus, regardless whether Lewis is correct that there could be no
"truth" or "falsity" as to the validity of Westmoreland's estimates of
enemy strength, the question whether the General's estimates were
honestly or dishonestly arrived at is the kind of question on which
courts rule daily.
A second reason why it would have been inappropriate to grant
39. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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summary judgment on the ground Lewis suggests is that CBS never
argued it. Its motion papers, which ran over a thousand pages, argued
many points, but not this one. Indeed, its principal argument was precisely to the opposite effect - that summary judgment should be
granted because what CBS stated in its documentary was true. 40
A third (and less significant) weakness in Lewis's argument is that
the standards for grant of summary judgment have changed drastically since my Westmoreland decision in 1984. In 1986, the Supreme
Court announced its summary judgment trilogy, including Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 41 which related directly to libel cases, and the Sullivan
rule. These decisions liberalize the standard for grant of summary
judgment, especially in the Second Circuit where the preexisting law
had been distinctly inhospitable. Had Anderson already been the law,
I might have granted summary judgment, but not for the reason Lewis
suggests. The reason would have related directly to the Sullivan rule.
Sullivan required Westmoreland not only to show that CBS was
wrong, but also to show by clear and convincing evidence that it was
dishonest in accusing him. Westmoreland had little evidence to show
that CBS was insincere in its position. That was CBS's strongest point
in the summary judgment motion. 42
40. My opinion rejecting it read as follows:
The principal bulk of defendants's voluminous briefs is dedicated to the point that summary
judgment should be granted because what was stated in the documentary was true. To this
contention, it is sufficient answer that plaintiff proffers evidence to the contrary. I express
no views on the persuasiveness of the proofs offered by either side. Summary judgment must
be denied if there is conflicting evidence on any substantial issue.
596 F. Supp. at 1172 (emphasis added).
Lewis was perhaps misled by the discussion of another CBS contention. CBS contended that
its charges were absolutely privileged as expressions of "opinion." This argument, however, did
not relate to opinion about the size of enemy strength, but to its opinion about Westmoreland's
dishonesty. The rule that shields matters of "opinion" from a libel does not include assertions of
criminal or dishonest conduct. My decision rejecting this contention stated:
The heart of [the] case centers on the accusations that General Westmoreland ordered, or
prevailed upon, his officers to draw dishonest conclusions and give false reports evaluating
intelligence data. An accusation of such misconduct is clearly outside the protection of the
"opinion" rule.
41. 477 U.S. 242 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
42. Lewis concludes the chapter by reporting that, when General Westmoreland dropped the
suit on the eve of its submission to the jury, I said to the jury in consolation that, "[j]udgments of
history are too subtle and too complex to be resolved satisfactorily with the simplicity of a jury's
verdict" and that it may therefore be "for the best that the verdict will be left to history." Lewis
agrees and adds that, if this was so, "the case should never have gone to trial. Judge Leval
should have granted summary judgment for CBS." P. 218. I assume Lewis's argument is more
rhetorical, or whimsical, than serious. I doubt he believes judges should dismiss cases whenever
they think the questions would be better answered by historians.
If this is a contention that requires answer, I believe the answers are easy. Court proceedings
give the plaintiff assurance that a presumptively neutral factfinder will focus on his case and
decide it. No matter how historically interesting the question is, the victim of libel has no assurance that neutral historians will take an interest in his dispute, study it, and render their opinions. Even if they do, historians have no power to award redress. A plaintiff who has lost his
job, or suffered financial ruin, due to a malicious libel, seeks compensation for his loss, as importantly as comforting vindication. It would be an odd rule oflaw that deprived him of his lawful
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* * *

I noted at the start that the importance of the Sullivan decision
was easily underestimated and that it had saved the nation from two
significant dangers. The first was the danger of either the destruction
of the press or, more probably, its effective censorship. The press
could not have paid the damages that southern courts and juries were
prepared to impose; the eventual and inevitable choice would have
been to stop reporting on the violent resistance to desegregation.
The second danger was a consequence of the first. Had the press
stopped reporting the violent resistance, would the civil rights movement have succeeded? The question is appalling, but real. Had the
press not served as a daily reminder of what was morally unacceptable, would the nation have found it easier to close its eyes and reenter
its hundred years of sleep? Would the civil rights movement have generated the solidarity, courage, and determination necessary to succeed,
not to mention the funding, without the press's daily revelations? At
the very least, we can safely surmise such huge changes would have
come far more slowly. When a movement for change derives its impetus from the grass roots, widespread communication of the sources of
discontent is necessary fuel.
And so, if Justice Brennan had not persevered through eight differently conceived drafts, tirelessly pursuing a majority for his theory
with ingenuity, patience, and diplomacy; if Justice Clark had not
found solace in the concept of "effective judicial administration/' we
might today have a very different United States - indeed, a very different world.
To say that the Sullivan decision was important and rescued us
from significant dangers, however, is not to say that it solved all the
problems. Indeed, the Sullivan decision created some problems that
had not existed before.
While the press won a limited immunity to awards of damages,
this was at considerable cost, especially to the journalists, columnists,
and commentators whose reputations came into play. Sullivan forced
them into the position of having to take some of their own medicine.
Previously, it was only the plaintiff whose reputation was at stake.
The issue was whether the derogatory reports about the plaintiff were
true or false. Sullivan brought in a new issue: whether the journalist
remedies merely because the issues raised by his suit might be interesting to historians. (Lewis's
suggestion sounds rather like the extreme position that the Times advocated and Justice Brennan
rejected in Sullivan.)
I do not contend that courts will necessarily reach correct judgments, or even better judg·
ments than historians. But if historians are indeed interested in pursuing the issue, the court
judgment in no way impedes them. In fact, to the contrary, the court proceeding may inciden·
tally help them. Because of the subpoena power available to parties to a lawsuit, the Westmore·
land case file revealed fascinating testimony of government officials from the Vietnam era who
would otherwise have remained silent. The lawsuit thus gave rise to the rare phenomenon of
historical exploration assisted by compulsory process.
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had deliberately lied. And how can a plaintiff prove that the press
intentionally misrepresented the facts if he cannot discover what information was in the defendant's possession? For the first time, libel
plaintiffs were given discovery of the investigative and editing process.
So journalists, who used to stay on the giving end of character assassination, now are required, by the decision that protected them, to share
the receiving end as well. And they hate it. Furthermore, by opening
the entire investigative, writing, and editing process to discovery and
litigation, Sullivan has rendered the litigation process enormously
more costly for both sides.
Although Sullivan protects the press from any award of damages
in the vast majority of cases, it does nothing to limit the amount of
damages in other cases. If a half million dollars seemed like a good
round number to an angry southern jury in the early 1960s, today's
juries gravitate toward vastly higher numbers. Still, one might ask, if
damages will be awarded only when the press has deliberately lied,
what is the harm? Perhaps it is best for press entities that deliberately
lie to be put out of business. There are several answers. If one reporter lied without the knowledge of the editor, does that justify closing down the press entity that employed her? Does it make sense that
the plaintiff (and his lawyer) should receive punitive damages (or
open-ended damages for pain and suffering) in the millions? Furthermore, a jury's finding of deliberate falsehood is not necessarily a true
finding, notwithstanding appellate court review - which is for sufficiency of the evidence, not for accuracy of the finding. It could be that
the plaintiff fabricated evidence of deliberate falsehood on the defendant's part. (If, for example, a plaintiff fabricates testimony that the
reporter admitted her reporting was false but said she was determined
to harm the plaintiff, this would satisfy the sufficiency test even though
the evidence was transparently false.)
Finally, in certain familiar cases, Sullivan results in grotesque unfairness to the plaintiff. Suppose that a plaintiff's enemy goes to the
press with outrageous lies about the plaintiff; the defendant-reporter is
hoodwinked and prints the lies in the good faith belief they are true;
plaintiff sues in an effort to rehabilitate his reputation. Plaintiff will
lose for a reason that is irrelevant to plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff could
care less whether the press-defendant believed or disbelieved the information. What matters to plaintiff is that he has been injured by a false
report. To make plaintiff the loser because the reporter was gullible
and believed a malicious falsehood can seem a very strange ordering of
priorities.
A partial solution to these problems lies within the grasp of the
litigants in appropriate cases. The solution is the no-money, no-fault
libel suit.
It is frequently said by libel plaintiffs that their motive in suing is
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not to win money but to restore a falsely injured reputation. If such a
plaintiff, nonetheless, sues for damages, he will lose, except in the unlikely event he can satisfy Sullivan by showing that the defendant
practiced deliberate (or reckless) falsification. If this plaintiff gives up
the claim for damages, the problems brought on by Sullivan will disappear. For the rule of the Sullivan case, requiring proof of actual malice, relates only to an award of money damages. The purpose of the
malice requirement obviously was not to protect falsehood from exposure. It was to protect the press from the intimidating threat of money
awards. Justice Brennan's opinion makes this very clear. The opening
sentence puts forth the question as "the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award
damages in a libel action brought by a public official."43 His formulation of the holding at the end of the opinion states "We hold today
that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for
libel. ...." 44 And through the body of the opinion, the discussion
focuses repeatedly on the huge size of the award and the intimidating
capacity of damage awards to stifle free debate.
The requirement of proving actual malice is a precondition to an
award of money damages. It is not a precondition to a declaratory
judgment finding a press report to be defamatory and false. If a plain·
tiff renounces his quest for damages, and seeks only a judgment declar·
ing the falsity of the defamatory statement, great advantages will flow
to both sides. For the defendants, journal and journalist, their integrity will no longer be under attack. It will be irrelevant whether the
statements about the plaintiff were made in good faith or with intent to
deceive. The defendants will also, as a consequence, be free of the
obligation to disclose the investigative and editing processes, as this
discovery relates solely to an issue no longer in dispute. The discovery
and the trial process will become markedly cheaper, because a major
issue will have been eliminated. And, finally, the defendants will have
achieved with certainty the major benefit that even Sullivan could not
promise: they will not be held liable for money damages. They can
conduct the litigation free of financial risk.
As to the advantages for the plaintiff, he increases enormously his
likelihood of coming out the winner and vindicating his reputation.
Furthermore, the litigation will be cheaper, both at discovery and
trial. In most cases the plaintiff gives up nothing to secure these ad·
vantages. If he is doomed to lose his damage claim because he cannot
43. 376 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). In Justice Brennan's first draft, reprinted in an appen·
dix of Lewis's book, he postulated a much broader question: "The extent that the protections for
speech and press ... delimit a State's power to apply its law of civil libel . .•• " App. 1, p. 1
(emphasis added). The narrowing of the question to the power to award damages was unques·
tionably deliberate, for the problem was money.
44. 376 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added).
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prove the defendant was acting in bad faith, the surrender of the claim
for money damages is virtually without cost.
Because such an approach seems to offer so many benefits to both
sides, I would expect to see it tried in time. It is interesting to contemplate what the consequence would have been for the trial of Sharon v.
Time, Inc. 45 if General Sharon had adopted this approach. Sharon
sued Time by reason of its report that shortly before a Christian
Phalangist massacre of Palestinians in a Lebanese camp, Sharon had
discussed with the Phalangist leaders their need to take revenge
against the Palestinians. In that case, the issue of truth or falsity of
Time's accusations against Sharon came down to a very simple issue:
whether Sharon had had a brief conversation with a Phalangist leader.
In contrast, the Sullivan issues relating to Time's newsgathering and
editing procedures were enormously complex. It is a fair assumption
that both sides would have saved millions if the Sullivan issues had
disappeared and the whole trial and discovery had been concerned
with the single question whether Sharon had made the statement attributed to him. Furthermore, had the issues been so limited, both
sides would have realized significant public relations benefits.
In that case, Judge Abraham Sofaer unbundled the verdict, requiring the jury to deliver special verdicts on each separate element. On
the issue of truth or falsity, the jury found for General Sharon. On the
issue of actual malice, it found for Time, making Time the winner of
the lawsuit. Nonetheless, it was on this issue that Time took the worst
beating; critics in the press found serious fault with the way Time had
gone about the fact gathering and checking of the story.46
Had the case been tried on a no-money, no-fault basis, Sharon
would have emerged the winner; the jury's finding in his favor on the
truth or falsity issue would have become the verdict and judgment.
Time, although the loser as to the accuracy of its story, would, of
course, have lost no money. In addition, it would have escaped the
major embarrassments it suffered at the world's critical appraisal of its
processes. It seems fair to say, both sides would have been better off in
the public eye, as well as saving vast sums in litigation costs.47

45. See 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y.), motion denied, 609 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
46. See RENATA ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986).
47. For a more complete discussion of such standards for libel litigation, see my article,
Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988). See also David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A
Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1986); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment
Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986). These and other pertinent discussions are collected in REFORMING LIBEL LAW (John Soloski & Randall P. Bezanson eds., 1992).

